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III. Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction under Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(e). 
IV. Statement of Issues Presented and Standard of Review 
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court committed plain and reversible error by 
accepting Mr. Hittle's plea of guilty without first advising him of his right to a speedy 
trial. 
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court committed plain and reversible error by 
accepting Mr. Hittle"s plea of guilty without first advising him that it would not be bound 
by the sentencing recommendations of the parties. 
Issue No. 3: Whether the trial court committed plain and reversible error by 
accepting Mr. Hittle's guilty plea following Mr. Hittle's clear statements that he was 
entering the plea under duress. 
Standards of Review: "The ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly 
complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness.1" State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 
(Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Holland. 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996)). 
Furthermore, because these issues were not presented to the trial court appellant 
bears the burden of showing that the trial court committed plain error. State v. Ostler, 996 
P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 2000). As such, Mr. Hittle must show that the ff(i) an error exists; (ii) 
1 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State 
v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Issue No. 4: Whether Mr. Hittle was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
when his trial counsel abandoned the duty of loyalty owed to his client in favor of other 
interests. 
Standards of Review: 
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for findings of fact made 
in conjunction with that decision. State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556; State v. Holland, 
921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996). 
VI. Citations to Determinative Statutes 
The following provisions of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure are directly at issue 
in this case: 
Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill. and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public 
trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in 
open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of 
defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
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VII. Statement of Facts 
This case comes the . urt follow inn the trial eour f s denial of Mr. Hit t le ' s Motion 
t 'V ' thdraw his Plea of Guilty entered i>> 1 loiioramv. , , ^ a ^ i M d b e r g o n J u ^ . ? "> 
1 In: Stale onginallN chained I III! I I mi il I I i M illllll! HI mini I i innin H N III Mi 
j r .v : ol U.C.A. § 76 -7 -201 . On April 10, 2000 , the State 
amended the Inforn lation by adding an additional couni of Cr 'minal ^V-.*' *M.;\ * a class 
A misdemeanor , also in \ i o h t i o i : of TT.C.A. § 76-"7-201 




 * attorney explained to the court that he anticipated his client 
would be will ing to plead guilty to Count One in the information, the class A 
misdemeanor charge , in exchange for the State 's agreement to UIMUI v> (he rem.ain.ing 
couni. IIIL uuru degree it'lnns Miaii.'i i il I i » ill I iiiiiiK pnnirs Innin i ajjieed "iiiiiiii 
;:| ;
 : 1 lid recoi in i lei id t : • tl ic Coi irt that Mr. H i t t l ebe required to pay back child support, that 
a one year jail sentence be imposed and suspended, and that Mr. Hittle be placed on. 
probation for a period of 36 months i 'I* 131), al I s l i t e r counse l ' s recitation ol the 
piopused agiccimiiiII llir ( 'omul U ' IMII III ' Wulr I! Il olli ipi ' .ii"« lollo\ "» 
T H E COUR'l Ail niiiu Mr. Hittle, before I accept this p r o p c „ J 
tcsolut!i»r i uan i to re\ icw with \ o u what mailers thai counsel has 
prohahh already cohered with yon but are important lor me to put on the 
record. \ ou understand ?ba* - well first of all., you understand ibis 
proposed resolution as a ua> of dealing, the proposal as a w.n -i de .- . 
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with this matter? 
MR. HITTLE: I understand it as being one of the ways of dealing 
with it, yes. 
THE COURT: More to the point, do you agree with this as a way of 
resolving this matter or do you wish to proceed to trial? 
MR. HITTLE: I've been placed under considerable duress but I'll 
agree to it. 
CP 139, at 3. 
The Court continued: 
THE COURT: Okay. But to get you to enter this plea, there have 
been no other offers, not other threats, nothing else given to you to get you 
to enter this plea? What I'm getting at is, this is something that you are 
choosing to do voluntarily? 
MR. HITTLE: I am doing it voluntarily because as I said before 
there has been a lot of stress involved, duress. 
CP 139, at 6. 
At that point the court changed the focus of its inquiry and began to advise Mr. 
Hittle in accordance with Rule 11. During the course of that discussion the trial court 
advised Mr. Hittle of several of the rights he would be giving up should he decide to 
enter a plea of guilty. CP 139, at 4 - 5. Although the court advised Mr. Hittle 
concerning the majoritv of his rights, the trial court failed to advise him of his right to a 
speedy trial. Furthermore, at no time during the hearing did the court inform Mr. Hittle 
that it would not be bound by the sentencing recommendation tendered by the parties. 
Following the incomplete recitation of the Rule 11 requirements and some 
clisi, USSIOII w illi I Jli I lillk1 and MIIIUMI. Hit aiiiit SUIIL I loi III invnnl 
THE COURT: I am accepting this pica but I vc got to lei \ ou KJ-W\, 
counsel, I have, I think Mr. 1 little has given every indication thai he"> 
feeling himself dragged into tin i am feeling very much caught in die 
middle in t e n m of a determination as to whether or noi to accept this pica 
I conclude thai on balance Mr. I little has addressed the elements of Rule 1 
and he ^ m fact making an intelligent and knowing plea, although clearly 
not one that he feels is voluntary on his part. That is an issue that I am 
concerned about but again I think that the question of voluntariness doesn ' t 
go to any coercion that has been imposed upon Mr. Hittle, but certainly, but 
simply his own sense as to the fairness of the proceedings in which he is -
or the options thai he is faced with And given that kis d of nan ow 
definition H whei-u- " m seeing this as \o iunt : r \ or n \oiuntar\ plea. T am 
going to accept the plea but ! just have to sa\ ! van: u nu! on the record 
thai I am troubled b\ this 
Following the court 's statement of concerns Mr. Hittle's counsel offered,' in an 
abundance of caution," the court;, to inquire of his client concerning the duress he felt he 
was under. C? 1 ^ ° at • -• 'he court diu m lact inquire of Mi I liltlt v\ ho. rum lluni, 
iNpLuiiLd I i lil i, ' I llii.t! III :\ will oiiiiii lied li.in I infi 'sl.ihlishmj.' Ilir initial rhild 
suppor* pavments; the payments of which the charges in the present case w ere based, CP 
139, ai ! (> - 2 : Tin. court considered Mr, Hittle's statements and concluded he was 
"competen t" » I" h ' ^ a t J I \i (iui poml Mr I Idllt cxuiuluJ and I i MI 
nunrpomln l iiiiiilni llin i n o i d tlmr "Stateim ' V f r lant Entering a Misdemeanor Plea 
of Gui l t} / la. See also, CP 56. However, at no time dining the colloqu\ did ih- inquire 
< r* tr. T link- j ^ J. whether he read the document or i mderstood its contents. Having 
accepux; e s plea as noted alun i lln LOIN I imposed iinlcn • I I1" .ill "' Vf. 
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On May 17, 2000, Mr. Hittle's attorney filed, via fax, a motion to withdraw his 
client's plea of guilty on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. CP, at 62-63. The 
docket reflects that the court denied the motion the following day. On June 21, 2000, 
Mr. Hittle appeared before the court for a review hearing. During that hearing the court 
considered the argument of counsel concerning Mr. Hittle's motion to withdraw his plea. 
Mr. Hittle's attorney explained that one of the reasons his client was attempting to 
withdraw his plea was because he felt force and intimidated by his attorney to do so. CP 
140, at 2. 
On July 14, 2000, the trial court executed the Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
to Withdraw Plea. CP, at 110. Mr. Hittle timely filed his Notice of Appeal on July 13, 
2000. 
VIII. Summary of the Arguments 
Mr. Hittle's conviction following his plea of guilty should be vacated for four 
reasons. First, the trial court failed to advise Mr. Hittle of his right to a speedy trial prior 
to accepting his plea of guilty. Second., the trial court failed to advise Mr. Hittle that it 
would not be bound by the sentencing recommendation tendered by the parties prior to 
accepting the plea. Third, the trial court improperly took Mr. Hittle's plea in spite of the 
fact that it was not voluntary. Finally, Mr. Hittle's trial counsel abandoned the duty of 
loyalty he owed his client thereby rendering his assistance ineffective. For each of the 
foregoing reasons, Mr. Hittle's conviction should be vacated. 
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IX. Argument 
A. The Trial Court Committed Plain And Reversible Error By Failing To 
Instruct Mr. Hittle Concerning His Speedy Trial Rights Prior to Accepting 
The Plea. 
It was clear error for the trial court to accept Mr. Hittle's plea of guilty without 
first having advised him of his right to a speedy trial. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(e) sets forth those rights which the trial court must explain to the defendant prior to 
accepting a plea of guilty. The rule provides, in pertinent part, "The court . . . may not 
accept [a plea of guilty] until the court has found . . . the defendant knows of. . . the right 
to a speedy public trial. . . ." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11(e)(3). Upon review, the Utah Courts 
have consistently held that the trial court bears of the burden of ensuring strict 
compliance with the Rule 11 requirements. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312, 
1313 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991). Under that 
standard, "the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is 
truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly 
waived his or her constitutional rights." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); 
see also Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1122. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Visser, 408 
Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 2000), the purpose of the Rule 11 "is to ensure that defendants 
know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to 
plead guilty." 
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In State v. Tarnawiecki, 5 P.3d 1222 (Utah App. 2000), a case decided under 
virtually identical facts, this court held that a trial court's failure to advise a defendant of 
his right to a speedy trial constitutes plain and reversible error. In that case, exactly like 
the case at bar, the defendant tendered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor charge. Prior to 
accepting the plea, defendant's attorney represented to the court that he had advised the 
defendant of the rights the defendant would be waiving by entering a plea of guilty. The 
trial court then advised the defendant of some of her rights but failed to instruct on the 
right to a speedy trial. Based on those facts, the court concluded, "The trial court's 
failure to conduct the required colloquy on the record advising defendant of her right to a 
speedy trial before an impartial jury was error." IdL (Citing State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 1065 
(Utah App. 2000). The court concluded, "the trial court's failure to advise defendant of 
her right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury was plain error, and we therefore 
vacate defendant's conviction and allow her to withdraw her guilty plea." 
The fact of this case are, in all pertinent respects, the same as the facts in 
Tarnawiecki and, therefore, a similar result must follow. Here, just as in Tarnawiecki, 
Mr. Hittle's counsel informed the court that he had instructed Mr. Hittle concerning the 
rights he would be waiving. CP 139, at 1. Thereafter, just as in Tarnawiecki, the court 
instructed Mr. Hittle but failed to instruct him concerning his right to a speedy trial. 
Based on those facts the court in Tarnawiecki found harmful error. Here, the same result 
must follow. 
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B. The Trial Court Committed Plain and Reversible Error By Failing To 
Advise Mr. Hittle That The Court Would Not Be Bound By The 
Sentencing Recommendations Tendered By The Parties. 
Much like the trial court's error in failing to advise Mr. Hittle of his right to a 
speedy trial, the trial court also committed plain error by failing to instruct him that the 
court would not be required to follow the recommended sentencing arrangement. In 
addition to requiring the trial court to advise defendants of certain rights they would be 
waiving in the event of a change of plea, Utah Rule Criminal Procedure 11 also requires 
the trial court to advise defendants that it is not bound by any proposed resolution the 
party may tender. Specifically, the Rule states, "If sentencing recommendations are 
allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 
11(g)(2). On its face, the use of the term "shall" in the rule indicates the legislatures 
intent that the rule must be followed. In addition, although the Utah courts of review 
have not passed directly on the issue, they have indicated in dicta that in order for the 
trial court to accept a plea of guilty, it must first instruct the defendant that the court is 
not required to follow any sentencing recommendations offered by the parties. See, State 
v. Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Kav. 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). 
That clearly did not happen in this case. Given the plain language of the statute, the use 
of the mandatory "shair within the Rule, and the higher courts' dicta on point makes the 
trail courts failure to instruct in accordance with Rule 11(g)(2) plain error. Furthermore, 
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much like the failure to instruct on Mr. Hittle's speedy trial rights, the 11(g)(2) error is 
prejudicial thereby requiring the court to vacate Mr. Hittle's conviction. 
C. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error In Accepting Mr. Hittle's Guilty 
Plea Because That Plea Was Not Made Voluntarily. 
The trial court also erred in this case by accepting the plea of guilty after, on at 
least two occasions, Mr. Hittle stated he was entering the plea under duress. CP 139, at 
3, 6. Rule 11 specifically states that a trial court cannot accept a plea of guilty until it 
determines that, "the plea is voluntarily made." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11(e)(2). Indeed, the 
very purpose of Rule 1 l(e)-(h) is to assure that when a defendant enters a plea of guilty 
he does so "freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the consequences of the plea." 
State v. Kav. 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). 
The record from the Change of Plea Hearing reveals two specific instances when 
Mr. Hittle informed the court he was entering his plea under duress. First, instance 
occurred as follows: 
THE COURT: More to the point, do you agree with this as a way of resolving this 
matter or do you wish to proceed to trial? 
MR. HITTLE: Eve been placed under considerable duress but I'll agree to it. 
CP 139, at 3. 
Thereafter, Mr. Hittle again informed the court that he was entering the plea under 
duress stating, "I am doing it voluntarily because as I said before there has been a lot of 
stress involved, duress." CP 139, at 6. 
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Taking a plea that is not voluntary is plain error. Furthermore, it is harmful as a 
violation of the very reason Rule 11 was adopted. As such, Mr. Hittle's convictions 
should be vacated on the grounds that his plea was taken involuntarily. 
D. Mr. Hittle's Conviction Should Be Vacated Because He Was Deprived Of 
The Effective Assistance Of Counsel. 
Finally, this court should vacate Mr. Hittle's conviction because he was not 
afforded the affective assistance of counsel. Specifically, during the plea colloquy Mr. 
Hittle's trial counsel made statements which where contrary to the best interests of his 
client. 
As a general proposition, in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, "a defendant must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in 
that it 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 579 
(Utah App.1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). However, a slightly different standard is employed when, 
as here, the claim is premised on the argument that trial counsel acted contrary to the 
interests of the client. 
The right to the undivided loyalty of counsel is a fundamental and indispensable 
part of the criminal justice system. For a criminal defense attorney it is not enough to 
simply be a friend of the court; counsel must at all times "play an active role as 
advocate." Evittsv. Lucev. 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985). Indeed, as the Utah Supreme 
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Court noted in State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996), "unless an attorney 
represents the interests of a client with zeal and loyalty, the adversarial system of justice 
cannot operate." Given the essential nature of the client's duty to the client to the 
proceedings in those cases where that duty is breached, prejudice is presumed. Gardner 
v. Holden. 888 P.2d 608 (Utah 1994). 
Here, Mr. Hittle's trial counsel's standard of conduct fell well below even the 
most liberal standard of reasonableness when he abandoned his role as zealous advocate 
for Mr. Hittle for the more comfortable role of friend of the court. On two occasions 
during the Rule 11 colloquy Mr. Hittle stated that he was entering the plea under duress. 
In spite of those comments, the court accepted Mr. Hittle's plea. In fact, the trial court 
went so far as to state on the record that she was very troubled by the fact that Mr. Hittle 
felt "dragged into this." CP 139, at 15. At that point Mr. Hittle had laid a firm 
foundation upon which to base a claim that his plea was involuntary. However, rather 
than preserving that issue for his client, Mr. Hittle's trial counsel put aside the best 
interests of his client in order to assist the court that the plea was properly taken. In that 
function. Mr. Hittle's attorney offered to the court, "And again, Your Honor, in an 
abundance of caution, perhaps the Court can request from Mr. Hittle as to any duress that 
he feels he's under right not what has not already been brought up to the Court?" CP 
139, at 16. As noted above, trial counsel has not place in ensuring the Rule 11 colloquy 
is properly conducted; that requirement rest exclusively with the trial court. By offering 
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his client up to the court for inquiry as to any duress Mr. Hittle may have been under, 
trial counsel changed his alliance rendering his performance ineffective. 
What is even more troubling than the plain fact that Mr. Hittle's counsel changed 
roles halfway through the colloquy is the question of why an attorney would elect to 
make such a decision. At that point in the proceedings the court had already stated it was 
going to accept the plea. Therefore, counsel could not have been concerned with 
ensuring that his client's intent to enter a plea be accomplished. Indeed, the only effect 
counsel's comment had was to weaken any future attempt by Mr. Hittle to withdraw his 
plea. That being the case, one could speculate that an attorney who did not want to 
represent a very difficult client any longer than absolutely necessary would have a vested 
interest in ensuring the client would not be able to come back at a later time and 
withdraw his plea. 
Regardless of the motive or reason for the comment, Mr. Hittle's trial counsel 
breached the duty of loyalty he owed to Mr. Hittle by requesting that the court inquire of 




For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully requests that Mr. Hittle's 
conviction be vacated. 
XL Request For Oral Argument 
The appellant respectfully requests that this matter be set for oral argument. 
XII. Statement re: Addendum 
As this case turns on primarily legal issues concerning the manner in which Mr. 
Hittle's plea was taken, an addendum is not necessary nor would it assist the court in 
resolving this case. 
Respectfully submitted to the court on this the 20th day of August, 2001. 
Edw^r4-Rfm5ntg<^ery 
Attorney for Appellant 
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